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THE RANKINGS GAME
The world that law schools inhabit is obsessed with rankings.
The most conspicuous example of this is the annual survey of law
schools by U.S. News and World Report. Although university
administrators ritually decry such rankings, their condemnations ring
hollow. After all, law schools regularly rank applicants and students,
as well as faculty performance. And it is common for the deans of
schools that "move up" in the rankings to trumpet their success, if not
to the world, then to their own faculties, alumni, students, and
prospective students.1 Thus, the schools themselves can hardly claim
an exemption from this hierarchical mentality.
In a similar vein, scholars have long sought to identify "great"
Supreme Court decisions. 2 The criteria for selection in such lists are
contestable. Should cases be chosen for their immediate impact? What
about decisions later overturned by the Supreme Court itself or by
constitutional amendment? Should cases be designated "great"
because of their enduring influence? Should cases be selected for their
outcome or for skillful legal reasoning? How, for example, to rank
Lochner v. New York (1905),3 discussed infra in the Article on Rufus
Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law and Professor of History.
Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science.
1. Indeed, there have been allegations that some law schools have attempted to game the
scoring system to boost their rankings. Amir Efrati, Law School Rankings Reviewed To Deter
"Gaming," WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2008, at Al.
2. E.g., PAUL FINKELMAN & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LANDMARK DECISIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 2008); GARY HARTMAN ET AL., LANDMARK SUPREME COURT
CASES: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(2004); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES!: 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW: MILESTONES IN OUR
LEGAL HISTORY (1976).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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W. Peckham? The doctrine of liberty of contract endorsed in that
decision was long ago abandoned. Yet Lochner remains at the heart of
an ongoing debate about the role of the judiciary in American
government and about the place of property and contract in the
hierarchy of constitutional values. Even today, Lochner is the subject
of a vast scholarly literature, which underscores the extent to which
the decision's legacy hovers over modern constitutional jurisprudence. 4
The Court's decision in Lochner was clearly significant. Having been
effectively overruled, however, should it be on a list of "great"
decisions? And what of judicial opinions that, at the time at least, did
not claim a majority on the Court? What of dissenting opinions? One
thinks immediately, in this regard, of Justice John Marshall Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 5 and Justice George Sutherland's
dissent in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934).6 But there
are others, such as Justice Harlan F. Stone's dissent in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis (1940),' Justice Felix Frankfurter's related
but antithetical dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette (1943),8 Justice Harry A. Blackmun's and Justice John Paul
Stevens's dissents in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 9 and Justice Antonin
Scalia's related but antithetical dissent in Lawrence v. Texas (2003).10
Teachers and scholars of law have long maintained their lists of
worthy (even canonical) decisions and opinions, regardless of their
claim to a majority of votes on the Court.
Given the legal academy's penchant for ranking, it is hardly a
surprise that legal scholars have turned their attention to crafting
lists of the greatest Justices of the Supreme Court.11 As with ratings of
decisions, however, the difficulties of articulating and applying
standards plague scholarly efforts to rank Justices. Are there
defensible criteria by which to assess judicial performance? To the
4. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 211-14 (2004); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990); Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in
GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94, 94-129 (Robert P. George ed., 2000); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 42-46 (2003); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A
Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner
Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003).
5. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. 290 U.S. 398, 448-83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
7. 310 U.S. 586, 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
8. 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
9. 478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. E.g., Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31
TULSA L.J. 93 (1995).
[Vol. 62:2:311
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extent that personal perspective colors evaluation, how might one
screen for political and ideological bias on the part of the evaluators?
Or is political favoritism inevitable? 12 Another concern is whether a
"presentist" bias skews ratings in a way that treats recent jurists more
kindly than those of other eras?13 Conversely, does reverence for
certain eras of the past elevate the status of some Justices? Additional
problems abound. The challenges facing the Justices in the pre-
Marshall Court of the 1790s were, in many respects, radically
different from those confronting the Supreme Court in the twenty-first
century. The nature of the Court's docket has similarly changed.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, moreover, Supreme Court
Justices were required to perform circuit court duties, an often
onerous task that drained time and energy. For these and other
reasons, few scholars and lawyers may be in a position to evaluate
meaningfully the work of Justices across the length and breadth of
American history. Before the 1920s, litigation of private law claims
occupied a large portion of the Court's time. As contemporary scholars
of the Court focus almost entirely on matters of public law, however,
the contributions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Justices may
be further downgraded. These issues of perspective aside, there is also
a matter of evidence: Some Justices left a wealth of private papers
while others did not. How might the availability of revealing
documents have led historians to devote more attention to particular
jurists, while overlooking others? 14
Several prominent Justices are well known for their extra-
judicial scholarship. Justices Joseph Story;15 Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.;1 6 and Benjamin Cardozo 17 come readily to mind. To what extent
12. For one version of this position, see William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That
Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 405-06 (1996):
Since the work of the Court is inextricably related to politics, the political
predilections of the persons who evaluate the justices inevitably influence
their rankings....
' Since most leading scholars favor judicial deference to the legislative
branch of government in economic matters and judicial activism in cases
involving personal liberties, it is not surprising that so-called "liberal"
justices are more highly ranked than what might be called "conservative"
justices.
13. See id. at 420-21 ("Judicial reputation also is affected by temporal proximity .... Since
many of the participants in the surveys are judges, lawyers, and law professors, rather than
legal historians, it is natural that many evaluators have a weakness for contemporary heroes.").
14. See id. at 428 ("[J]ustices are more likely to receive more kindly treatment from
biographers if they maintain ample documentation of their work.... Justices whose papers have
been lost or destroyed naturally will suffer from neglect by historians.").
15. E.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1833).
16. E.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
20091 313
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should the publication of influential writings be considered in
assessing a Justice's work on the Court? Does significant scholarship
make the author a great jurist? Does it unduly impress academic
evaluators?
The reputation of some Justices may be enhanced or
diminished by systematic campaigns.18 The rankings of Holmes and
Louis D. Brandeis, in particular, have benefited from active promotion
of their "greatness" by devoted cheerleaders. 19 Conversely, Justices
who championed economic liberty, and especially those perceived as
opponents of New Deal constitutionalism, have often been belittled.20
At the same time, we should note that a bevy of scholars today are
seeking to rehabilitate the reputations of economic libertarian
Justices21 and to cast doubt on the work of New Deal Justices. 22
In 1938, Roscoe Pound made a pioneering effort to identify the
ten leading federal and state judges, four of whom were Supreme
Court Justices. 23 Pound's list consisted of his own impressionistic
(though well-informed) selections. In 1957, Justice Felix Frankfurter
named sixteen Supreme Court Justices whom he considered great. 24
In 1972, Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky undertook a more
17. E.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
18. John Phillip Reid, Commentary: Beneath the Titans, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 661-62
(1995) ("[TJhe canonization of .. . Justice[s] does not always result from a burst of sudden
revelation. Sometimes it has been the promotion of worshipful veneration by a mixed host of
scheming angels made up of any combination of political scientists, law professors, journalists,
dramatists, and professional opinion molders.").
19. See generally G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis:
Epistemology and Judicial Reputation, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576 (1995).
20. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 284-88, 298-301 (2000)
(arguing for a reevaluation of the conservative Justices once stigmatized as the Four Horsemen
of the Apocalypse); Brian Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists 76-83 (St.
John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 123498 (arguing that the description of pre-
New Deal jurisprudence as "legal formalism" was driven "primarily by political considerations,"
and was largely false).
21. E.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF
MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995).
22. E.g., ARKES, supra note 21, at 106-11, 159-62 (questioning sharply the reputation of
Justice Benjamin Cardozo); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE
CONSTITUTION 92-93 (2006) (criticizing Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's reasoning in West
Coast Hotel, a minimum wage case); MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND
REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S, 99-105, 183-84 (2001)
(casting doubt on the analysis of economic issues by Justice Louis D. Brandeis).
23. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 30-31 n.2 (1938) (including
Justices John Marshall, Joseph Story, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Benjamin Cardozo on the
list).
24. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781,
783-84 (1957).
314
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systematic attempt to rank Justices. 25 They polled sixty-five professors
of law, history, and political science regarding the first one hundred
Justices to serve on the Supreme Court. Based on this poll, Mersky
and Blaustein categorized the Justices as great, near great, average,
below average, or failures. But this approach was not free of difficulty.
For example, the ratings of some individual Justices seem
questionable or dated. More troublesome, the study's methodology is
suspect. For one thing, the device was a poll, consisting only of votes
cast, with no reasons or evidence given other than the collective
preferences of the evaluators. Mersky himself suspected that this
method produced a bias in favor of twentieth-century Justices. 26 He
also speculated that his rankings "show a liberal tilt."27 Other scholars
have also employed the survey method but asked respondents to
indicate the criteria they used in making valuations.28
In recent years, scholars have proposed alternative approaches
in an effort to rank Justices on the basis of visible, measurable criteria
(and not merely the perceptions or preferences of the rankers). In
2000, Mersky and William D. Bader prepared a study of the number of
books and articles written about particular Supreme Court Justices,
and they used this information as a basis for ranking. 29 Taking a
different path, some scholars have relied on citation counts to evaluate
judicial performance. 30 Still, there is room to question whether ratings
based on such criteria can sensitively, much less accurately, determine
the greatness of a Justice.
With the inadequacy of various rating systems in mind, the
Program in Constitutional Law and Theory at Vanderbilt University
Law School sponsored a Conference on Neglected Justices, held over
two days in April of 2008. Professor James W. Ely, Jr., was the
principal organizer. The Conference was grounded on the thought that
our understanding of the history of the Supreme Court may be
distorted by an undue concentration on a handful of notable figures.
One consequence of this preoccupation is that a number of Justices,
25. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES:
STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978).
26. Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman, Ranking of the Justices, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 823, 823 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed.
2005).
27. Id.
28. Robert C. Bradley, Who Are the Great Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?, in
GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STUDIES 1, 1-29 (William D.
Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993).
29. WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES 21-32
(2004).
30. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 80-91 (1990).
2009]
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some of whom may have been prominent in their own day, receive
little attention from today's scholars. The Conference was designed
not only to shed light on the contributions of less well-known jurists,
but also to consider the broader question of judicial reputation. The
reputations of historical figures-judges included-are continually
evolving and frequently ephemeral. Why are some Justices relegated
to the back pages of history while others seemingly enjoy an enduring
high repute? Are those reputations deserved? Is it time for a
reassessment? Our goal was to assemble a group of leading scholars to
consider these issues while exploring the careers of individual
Justices.
The articles in this Symposium issue of the Vanderbilt Law
Review came from presentations at the April 2008 Conference. They
span the Supreme Court's history from the 1790s to the 1950s. The
authors examine Justices whose contributions to the Court and to
constitutional history have arguably been overlooked or undervalued
by current scholars. Several of these jurists wrote landmark decisions
or dissenting opinions. All of them participated in important cases. We
make no claim that each of these individuals was a judicial giant.
Rather, our suggestion is that scholars cannot fully comprehend the
Supreme Court's history by focusing only on the giants. History is best
understood as a mosaic composed of many pieces.
Which pieces to consider? The Justices covered in the
Conference do not constitute a comprehensive list. In fact, we received
several insightful suggestions for additional inclusion. It was largely
because of constraints on time that we confined the list to the Justices
discussed. We recognize that some of the Justices discussed at the
Conference-Samuel Chase, David J. Brewer, and George Sutherland,
for example-have received more scholarly attention than some
others. But it was our judgment that each Justice included in the
Symposium deserved a fresh look. Still, when all was said and done, a
few of us in attendance concluded that, if certain of the Justices were
obscure, they deserved to be.
Conversation in and around the Conference raised one further,
intriguing question: If some Justices are neglected, might others be
overrated? Should the legacies and reputations of such notable jurists
as John Marshall, Story, Roger B. Taney, Holmes, or Brandeis-to
mention only a few of the names that participants and interested
parties offered-be reexamined with a more critical eye?31 This issue
was beyond the scope of this particular Conference and Symposium,
31. For a suggestive study along these lines, see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
316 [Vol. 62:2:311
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but it may well serve to stimulate new avenues of inquiry,
conversation, and scholarship.3 2
To explore these questions we assembled a group of leading
scholars. G. Edward White, in a keynote address, questioned the
existence of meaningful baselines to compare the performance of
Justices over time. Other participants presented major papers dealing
with individual Justices: Stephen B. Presser (Samuel Chase); William
R. Casto (James Iredell); Mark R. Killenbeck (William Johnson);
Herbert A. Johnson (Bushrod Washington); Austin L. Allen (John
Catron); Paul Finkelman (John McLean); J. Gordon Hylton (David J.
Brewer); James W. Ely, Jr. (Rufus W. Peckham); Samuel R. Olken
(George Sutherland); David R. Stras (Pierce Butler); and Linda C.
Gugin (Sherman Minton). The intellectual dialogue at the Conference
was strengthened by the thoughtful remarks of the commentators:
Mark E. Brandon, Daniel Sharfstein, Alfred L. Brophy, Linda
Przbyszewski, and Lisa Bressman. Suzanna Sherry moderated a
stimulating roundtable discussion to conclude the Conference.
We should acknowledge and express our appreciation to several
persons who played essential roles in the Conference. We are grateful
to the staff and editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review, especially
Symposium Editors Ty Shaffer and Andrew Smith. Ty recognized from
the beginning the Conference's scholarly potential, and both Ty and
Andy have helped to ensure that the knowledge generated is
disseminated beyond the impressive audience that attended the event.
Linda Reynolds managed with skill and aplomb the difficult logistics
of planning and putting on a program of this nature, a challenge that
involves endless details. With efficiency and good cheer, Dorothy
Kuchinski also assisted in organizing the event.
Last, but certainly not least, we extend our gratitude to the
participants in the Conference and Symposium. The Conference was
distinguished by fine papers and dynamic intellectual exchanges, from
beginning to end. We learned from every one. And we believe that the
resulting Articles in this Symposium constitute a major addition to
the literature on the Supreme Court's history.
32. Similarly, lists of so-called "great" cases could be reconsidered. For a different approach,
see ROBERT A. LEVY & WILLIAM MELLOR, THE DIRTY DOZEN: How TWELVE SUPREME COURT
CASES RADICALLY EXPANDED GOVERNMENT AND ERODED FREEDOM (2008) (selecting the twelve
"worst" Supreme Court decisions between the New Deal era and the present, measured by a
commitment to limited government).
2009] 317
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